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I. INTRODUCTION
Credit and especially debit card transactions are on the rise worldwide.
Interchange fees are an integral part of the pricing structure of credit and debit
card transactions. Indirectly paid by merchants to card issuers, interchange
fees in most countries are set by credit and debit card networks. But in one
country, Australia, the central bank is regulating interchange fees, and in sev-
eral other countries and areas, including the European Union, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, public officials are taking or
are considering taking a more hands-on regulatory stance. And in the United
States, it is largely the court system that is debating interchange issues. 
The payments industry has a strong vested interest in interchange fees.
They are a major portion of costs that merchants pay for processing debit
and credit card payments and are a major source of revenue for banks that
issue the cards. One reason for recent interest in interchange fees in the
United States is a shift in retail payments away from checks. Research
sponsored by the Federal Reserve documents a rise in electronic payments
and a decline in the use of paper checks, with a milestone recently passed
where the majority of non-cash payments are now made using electronic
instruments.
1 This shift is also occurring in other countries, as shown by
the Weiner and Wright research summarized below. Since paper checks
typically do not have an interchange fee while credit and debit payments
do, the shift is a major reason why merchants face a rapidly rising cost of
processing payments. Card issuers, on the other hand, rely on associated
revenues to provide a return to their substantial investment in card pay-
ment networks. 
This conference explored issues surrounding interchange fees. What are
the trends in interchange fees, including credit cards and debit cards? What
is the economic rationale for interchange fees? What opinions do partici-
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 pants in the payment system have about interchange? What role, if any,
should central banks and other public institutions play in establishing or
overseeing interchange fees?
The unique conference design brought together many parties that have an
interest in interchange fees. Industry participants, antitrust authorities, cen-
tral bankers, and academics each had opportunities to formally express their
experiences and viewpoints. In addition, considerable time was devoted to
discussion periods, which allowed audience members to be actively involved
in conveying diverse and, at times, impassioned counterarguments. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the many issues and participant
perspectives concerning interchange fees by providing summaries of the for-
mal presentations made in various sessions and highlights of contributions
made by participants in each session’s discussion period. After first provid-
ing an introduction to the mechanics of interchange fees, this paper will
generally follow the flow of conference presentations. The second section is
on the economics of interchange, summarizing two academic papers con-
cerned with global trends and the economic rationale of interchange. The
third and fourth sections focus on industry perspectives presented during a
panel discussion and two keynote speeches. The fifth and sixth sections
summarize panel sessions devoted to public policy issues involving antitrust
authorities and central bankers. The paper closes with a short conclusion. 
A. A brief introduction to the mechanics of interchange fees
The mechanics of interchange fees are complex, involve many parties,
and use arcane terminology. This section briefly reviews interchange
mechanics to provide background to readers unfamiliar with details of pay-
ments processing so that they can more easily follow arguments presented
elsewhere in this volume. 
Chart 1 provides a stylized diagram of information and payment flows
in a four-party card payment system. It is called a four-party system
because it involves a cardholder, a card-issuing bank, a merchant, and a
merchant bank. Flows of transaction information begin with the purchase,
when the cardholder provides debit or credit card information to the mer-
chant. The merchant sends the card information to its bank, which passes
it along to the card-issuing bank. Card networks, such as Visa or
MasterCard (for credit cards) or the NYCE or Star networks (for PIN debit
cards) typically provide the link between merchant banks and card-issuing
banks over which this information flows. The network routes information
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 first to authorize and then to settle the payment. To settle, the card-issuing
bank obtains funds from the cardholder—$100 in this example—with
which it can pay the merchant bank.
However, the card-issuing bank retains a portion of the funds as an inter-
change fee. In this example, the fee is $1.50 and the card-issuing bank
sends $98.50 to the merchant bank. The merchant bank charges the mer-
chant a processing fee of $.50 and deposits $98 in the merchant’s account.
The merchant service charge is the total cost of processing the payment
and in this example is $2 or 2 percent of the transaction.
2 The interchange
fee thus represents revenue to the card-issuing bank paid by the merchant
through the merchant bank. 
This example is highly simplified and leaves out many details of real
world provision of payment services.
3 Three additional details should be
mentioned. First, companies called “merchant acquirers” often act as inter-
mediaries between merchants and the merchant bank by processing trans-
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Chart 1:
A Four-Party Card Payment System
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5. Card-issuing bank sends $98.50 to merchant bankaction information for the merchant. Second, American Express and
Discover use a different model called a “three-party card system,” in which
the card network issues cards and performs the services of the merchant
acquirer. Because the network plays both roles, there is no need for an
explicit interchange fee. Some observers argue that merchant service
charges in three-party systems contain an implicit interchange fee because
the merchant service charges have a similar magnitude compared to that in
four-party systems. Third, there are two types of debit cards, signature and
PIN, distinguished by whether at the time of the transaction a signature or
entry of a personal identification number is required. In general, credit
cards carry the highest interchange fee, PIN debit the lowest, with signa-
ture debit in between. 
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
The conference started with presentations of two papers that analyze the
role of interchange in payments markets. Economists have recently turned
their attention to the subject of interchange fees because these types of
markets are increasingly important but not well understood. 
The topic of the first paper, coauthored by Stuart Weiner and Julian
Wright, is international developments in interchange. The paper begins
with a discussion of the economic role of interchange fees. In a four-party
card payment system, interchange fees link card-issuing and merchant
banks, which take the fee into consideration when deciding the level and
type of payment services they offer to each other as well as to their cardhold-
ing and merchant customers. It is an example of a two-sided market, a prin-
ciple feature of which is the interrelation between end users of a product.
The market would not work if merchants accepted cards but there were no
cardholders, and vice versa. The interchange fee is a key instrument that
networks can use to balance the two sides of the payments market and
achieve an appropriate ratio of cardholders and accepting merchants.
Interchange fees are common to payment systems throughout the world,
and in the second part of their paper, Weiner and Wright review issues and
developments in 10 countries. The striking outcome of this section is the
diversity of how card payment systems work across these countries. For
example, interchange fees are sometimes set by members of a network, by
regulatory limits, by network management, by members of bankers 
associations, or bilaterally between card-issuing and merchant banks. 
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 Weiner and Wright find that interchange fees are generally stable or declin-
ing in most countries. In many of these countries, declines have been
because of recent regulatory action or regulatory threat. The most common
public authority to take these actions has been the competition authority
in each country, although the central banks of Australia, Mexico, and Spain
have been very active as well. Experience in the United States is different
from other countries because in recent years its interchange fees generally
have been rising. 
The final section of Weiner and Wright’s paper reviews possible economic
determinants of interchange fees, such as the costs of card-issuing and 
merchant banks, demand for card services by cardholders and merchants,
market power of card-issuing and merchant banks, and competition between
alternative types of payments. The authors then attempt to confirm one 
prediction of economic theory with a simple statistical analysis between
measures of market power of card issuers and the level of interchange fees.
They only find a weak, positive relationship but argue that it does not 
necessarily suggest that market power is an unimportant determinant of
interchange fees. Rather, to properly sort out the economic determinants of
interchange fees, research would need to account simultaneously for several
factors that might influence interchange fees. 
Weiner and Wright conclude by noting two implications of the finding
that interchange fees are determined by many different factors. First,
industry participants, academics, and public authorities face a significant
challenge in understanding changes in interchange fees. Second,
researchers and policy authorities need richer sources of data to achieve
that understanding. 
In his comments on Weiner and Wright, Alan Frankel focuses on what
interchange fees actually do in the marketplace and what that implies for
interchange fee differences across countries. Card issuers, for example, may
provide some benefits to merchants, and interchange fees provide a vehicle
for reimbursement to card issuers. This underlies the call for a cost-based
determination of interchange fees but is problematic because some issuer
costs are endogenous, especially promotions and reward programs, so that
card issuers have little incentive to control those costs. Interchange fees can
also balance end user demands in a two-sided market and solve an exter-
nality whereby one end user in a two-sided market has insufficient incen-
tive to use a product. This role attracts the most attention of economists
but has conceptual issues. For example, existence of an externality that
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and so merchants should welcome rather than resist the subsidy. 
A less benign view is that interchange fees shift revenue toward the side
of the market with more market power. Frankel argues that certain 
elements of the credit card market are consistent with market power on the
part of card issuers which, in turn, explains rising interchange fees observed
in the United States and Canada. By contrast, in countries with stable or
declining interchange fees, either merchants have some power to resist
increases in interchange fees (such as adding a surcharge to credit card 
payments) or there has been some measure of regulatory intervention. 
Two topics dominated the open discussion period. First, why are there
few alternative suppliers for credit card services? Are there barriers to entry
that limit competition? Panelists responded that there are other networks,
such as PIN debit, but their mere existence does not necessarily address
concerns over efficiency because consumers have incentives to use credit
cards or signature debit, which are more expensive to process. Moreover,
even with a monopoly network, market performance may be adequate as
long as there is competition on both sides of the market. One reform 
proposed in Australia would open up card networks to nonbank acquirers.
Panelists agreed that more nonbank participation in various areas of 
payments or relaxing restrictive rules should enhance competition. 
Second, how does the existence of three-party systems, such as American
Express or Discover, affect interchange fee policies of Visa or MasterCard?
Panelists responded that these systems do compete with and influence one
another. The regulation of Visa and MasterCard interchange fees in
Australia forced American Express to lower its fees to remain competitive.
However, American Express may make a poor example to emulate because
to some extent its market power has allowed it to charge relatively high fees. 
The second paper, coauthored by David Evans and Richard Schmalensee,
explores the economic rationale of interchange fees. The paper notes that
soon after they began, three-party systems adopted a pricing structure that
was highly asymmetric, with merchant fees providing the bulk of revenue.
Economic theory has shown that under plausible conditions, one side of the
market will not pay for the service. This helps explain highly asymmetric
pricing in markets such as for real estate services in the United States where
sellers pay for services or for customer parking at shopping malls where the
mall’s merchants pay the parking fee. In these situations, members of one
side of the market typically receive a strong benefit from participation of
members of the second side. 
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 Because at the time none of the new card payment companies had mar-
ket power, Evans and Schmalensee argue that this price structure would be
the natural outcome of a competitive two-sided market. The fact that four-
party systems came after the three-party systems yet still adopted a similar
price structure suggests they are using an efficient pricing mechanism. 
Early economic analysis of interchange fees in multiparty systems assumed
competition among card issuers and merchant acquirers. It identified features
of these markets such as usage externalities and the balancing role of inter-
change fees. Subsequent analysis has introduced market imperfections into
the analysis of two-sided payment markets that has generated some interest-
ing contrasts with imperfections in typical one-sided markets. In one-sided
markets, a monopoly harms consumers by restricting output and raising
price. A monopoly intermediary in two-sided markets has similar potential to
harm consumers, but also has the potential to enhance the value of the system
by setting an interchange fee that balances the two sides of the market. 
More important, the interchange fee set by the intermediary may be
equal, above, or below the interchange fee that would produce the largest
amount of social welfare. As a result, a socially optimal interchange fee is
not easy to identify, and regulation of interchange fees may or may not
improve performance and enhance economic welfare. Regulated 
interchange fees, such as a cost-based fee or zero interchange, are unlikely
be socially optimal. 
Because theory provides little guidance, Evans and Schmalensee empha-
size that empirical evidence must play a leading role in assessing potential
market failure. Society would be better off if it relied most heavily on the
most efficient payment system, and one empirical strategy is to examine
whether various types payments are over- or underutilized relative to some
social optimum. In practice, measurement of the costs of various forms of
payment is very difficult, but the intuition is compelling: Electronic pay-
ments are likely more efficient than paper checks because ease of transport
and economies of scale in processing favor electronic payments. However,
establishing that a particular product is less costly to produce does not
demonstrate superiority because it ignores benefits of the product. It is not
unusual for a high-cost product to drive out a lower-cost product if the
high-cost product has superior qualities. 
Even if research establishes that it would be socially optimal to reduce the
use of a particular form of payment, would interchange fee regulation
accomplish the goal? For example, simply reducing interchange fees may
not lead to expected benefits. Card issuers may not raise transaction fees on
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holders may not change the amount of their card transactions. Nor is it
guaranteed that merchant acquirers would pass savings along to retailers or,
if they did, that retailers would pass savings along to consumers in the form
of lower prices. 
In the first of two comments on the paper by Evans and Schmalensee,
Michael Katz acknowledges that economic theory does not unambiguously
show benefits of regulation. Katz argues, however, that the facts of the pay-
ments marketplace do provide information that can help guide policy. For
example, prices that maximize network and social welfare may differ in a
variety of ways but the nature of merchant incentives suggests that relative
network prices will be biased toward high merchant service charges.
Moreover, in the United States, most agree that networks place greater
emphasis on issuer profits than acquirer profits and that acquirers pass along
more of any changes in fees to their customers compared to issuers—both
of which suggest that interchange fees will be above the efficient level. 
Katz concludes by noting that payment market characteristics may allow
policymakers to reduce their needs for information. Due to the maturity of
the card payment market, merchants find accepting cards a competitive neces-
sity and would therefore be insensitive to small changes in merchant fees. If
so, the effect of changes in interchange fees would be felt primarily on the
consumer side of the market, allowing policymakers to treat the market as
one-sided. To achieve a socially optimum mix of payments, policymakers
could strive to ensure that consumers face prices for payments that reflect their
underlying social costs. Even with this simplification, however, the most help-
ful role of public authorities at present may be to continue to collect and ana-
lyze information about the payments market.
In the second comment on Evans and Schmalensee’s paper, Jean-Charles
Rochet begins by investigating “the interchange fees mysteries,” in which he
tries to uncover evidence for the “crime” of charging excessive interchange
fees. Is there evidence of excessive use of credit cards? There is some slight
inefficiency from holding too many cards, but that is outweighed by 
evidence that shows electronic payments to be more efficient than cash or
checks. Is there evidence of excessive bank profits? While banks have been
doing well recently, the best solution may be to improve competition rather
than regulate interchange fees. 
Even if evidence supports excessive interchange fees, regulating inter-
change fees may make things worse because some regulatory proposals are
based on incomplete understanding of interchange fees. A zero or cost-based
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 interchange fee may not allow incentives for consumers to use cards that may
be needed in the presence of free options like cash or checks. Finally, a
mandatory reduction in interchange fees may cause issuers to impose 
consumer fees and could cause consumers to hold fewer cards. If so, mer-
chants would be under more pressure to accept all cards and, thus, would
reduce their ability to steer customers toward preferred types of payments. 
During the open discussion, a large number of questions centered on the
apparent disparity between the resource cost of various payment instru-
ments and the prices that consumers face for using those instruments.
Panelists generally agreed that consumers do not face appropriate price sig-
nals for payment alternatives but did not agree on the extent of the result-
ing distortions. 
Establishing that transactions are significantly misallocated requires calcu-
lation of the net social cost (resource cost net of benefits for all users) for
each payment type. Because no such definitive calculation exists, said some
panelists, there may be no significant distortion in the use of various pay-
ment instruments. Other panelists suggested that it may not be so easy to
dismiss potential payment market distortions. For example, even if existing
analysis is incomplete, other evidence on benefits, such as fraud rates or
speed of transactions, only reinforces the overall superiority of PIN debit
over signature debit. Yet the market, at least in the U.S. case, has provided
consumers with incentives to use signature debit and discourages PIN debit. 
Panelists also noted that surcharges by merchants could improve consumer
incentives and add competitiveness to the payments market. Skeptics argue
that there is no widespread surcharging where it is allowed and so it may be
ineffective. But absence of surcharging does not mean it does not affect com-
petition in payments; the simple threat of surcharging could influence the
behavior of card issuers. Nor does permitting surcharges imply that it neces-
sarily would be good to eliminate interchange. In Australia, for example, sur-
charging is allowed, but only certain merchants choose to do so. It may be
useful to have both an interchange fee and an ability to surcharge in order to
accommodate heterogeneous merchants. 
III. NETWORK, ISSUER, ACQUIRER, AND MERCHANT PERSPECTIVES
A panel of industry executives highlighted the depth of the divide in views
on interchange between merchants on one side and networks and banks on
the other. Networks and banks argued that interchange fees are necessary for
the four-party networks to maximize volume and compete with other net-
works. Panelists representing the merchant view saw interchange fees and net-
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any power to negotiate price. The disagreement extended to the expected
impact of regulatory action on these markets—on consumers and the net-
works themselves.
In his remarks, Xavier Durieu noted the evolutionary progress made in
Europe toward more transparent, more competitive payments markets, but
that intervention by the European Commission and several national 
competition authorities was necessary. Durieu explained that the acquiring
market is domestic, which limits competition for the 20 percent of the 
merchant discount that is not represented by interchange fees. He argued
that even if the acquiring market was more competitive, competition on the 
issuing side of the market will drive up interchange fees. Durieu advocated
regulatory intervention to ensure transparency, more competition, and a
fairer distribution of the costs among stakeholders. 
José Gabeiras discussed recent developments in Spain, including the
Spanish competition authority’s decision to reject an application from
Spanish banks to allow them to set a common interchange fee. By July
2005, the Spanish Competition Tribunal will require that interchange fees
be limited by the amount of costs associated with debit and credit transac-
tions, separately. Gabeiras noted that an appeal may be filed.
John Gove summarized the Australian experience following the Reserve
Bank of Australia’s implementation of cost-based interchange fees, the
elimination of the “no surcharge” rule, and the relaxation of network mem-
bership rules to include nonbanks. Despite credit card interchange rates
declining from .95 percent to around .50 percent in Australia, credit card
spending continues to increase, four-party networks continue to thrive,
and banks continue to earn profits in their card services divisions—albeit
more from cardholders and less from the merchants. This latter result is
consistent with the Reserve Bank of Australia’s policy objective—to align
cardholder costs with benefits such as loyalty programs that incent card-
holders to use a less efficient payments system. 
Despite economic arguments that suggest little justification for cost-
based interchange fees, Gove noted that regulatory authorities in Australia,
the EU, and the United Kingdom are mandating cost-based interchange as
a way, in the merchants’ view, to more equitably distribute benefits of the
network. Gove suggested that the case for cost-based interchange may be
even clearer in the United States, as it maintains the highest interchange
fees in the world, yet its costs should be among the lowest, given economies
of scale and declining cost trends for processing, fraud, and credit. Finally,
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 Gove attributed the increase in regulatory action in these markets to the
fact that payments are moving from non-interchange-based systems (cash
and checks) to systems that have interchange and where the networks exert
market power over rates, rules, and membership.
B.J. Haasdijk pointed out that cooperation among the eight banks that
own Interpay, the only Dutch debit card network, was essential to the
development of what some consultants cite as one of the lowest-cost card
payments networks in the world. Interpay handled merchant acquiring as
well as processing when first established. Haasdijk explained that while
interchange fees for Interpay’s debit card transactions were set at zero, the
shareholder banks were paid dividends representing their share of transac-
tion volume as issuers and were thereby reimbursed for their authorization
costs as if interchange fees were paid. 
In response to a commission established by the Dutch central bank to
increase competition and transparency, Interpay sold its acquiring business
to network banks and spun off a separate company with authority to set
network rules. Last year, despite having one of the lowest fee structures in
Europe, the Dutch competition authority fined Interpay and its owner
banks for charging excessive fees relative to costs. Haasdijk believes policy-
makers need to better balance the desire for competition with the benefits
of cooperation in a concentrated payments market.
Turning to the United States, William Sheedy and Susan Webb made the
case for unregulated interchange fees. Sheedy presented data showing that
Visa’s interchange fees have increased only modestly in the United States
over the past 15 years. He argued that competition among thousands of
merchant acquirers constrains merchant discount fees and that merchants
do have negotiating power. Sheedy cited merchant benefits from card pay-
ments, including higher sales per customer, new sales channels (for exam-
ple, the Internet), faster checkout, and a payment guarantee. Moving to
consumer benefits, Sheedy noted that competition on the issuing side of
the market has caused a decline in both cardholder fees and net borrowing
costs. Finally, Sheedy suggested that if interchange were regulated, borrow-
ing costs would increase, merchants would pay more as American Express
gained a larger market share, and investments in product innovation and
fraud prevention would not occur.
Webb echoed many of the points made by Sheedy: that merchants derive
significant value from card networks; that pricing is competitive, especial-
ly compared to handling cash; that merchants do have choice in cash dis-
counting, co-branding deals, and which networks to work with; and that
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The discussion period highlighted the disagreement between networks
and issuers on the one hand and merchants on the other with respect to
market power. Networks and issuers claimed that the general but moderate
rise in interchange fees in the United States results from normal market
forces that reflect the value of the services to all parties while merchants say
the rise is more dramatic and reflects the major networks’ market power. 
Networks maintained that they are willing to negotiate deals with 
merchants if they would steer consumers to use their cards. Merchants
responded that the competitiveness of their markets and consumer attitudes
about payments options forced them to offer all forms of payment on an
equal basis. On the question of whether lower interchange fees would be
reflected in lower prices to consumers or higher profits for merchants, the
extent of price competition in merchant businesses was viewed as important.
Economists also conceded that the impact of reductions in interchange fees
on consumer prices in the aggregate is difficult to measure. 
IV. KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
The two keynote speakers, attorneys Lloyd Constantine of Constantine
Cannon and Noah Hanft of MasterCard, presented their cases for and
against the need for regulatory intervention in the credit and debit card
markets. Constantine asserted that both the debit and credit card markets
have failed and called for the Federal Reserve to regulate debit and the
Department of Justice to intervene in the United States credit cards mar-
ket. Hanft pointed to what he viewed as the success of the card payment
markets, measured by the number of cardholders, merchants, transactions,
and value growing each year as evidence that the markets are efficient and
working well. 
Constantine, who represented merchants in the so-called Wal-Mart liti-
gation, argued that Federal Reserve intervention in the debit card market
would not create a new regulated world but would “recreate a world which
existed for 15 years in the United States in a free market environment.” He
described the rise to dominance in the early 1990s of the regional PIN
debit networks as more efficient and less risky than the signature debit
alternative offered by Visa and MasterCard, employing an “at par” pricing
model. He attributed the decline of PIN debit networks later that decade
to a “predatory assault” by Visa and MasterCard seeking to preserve inter-
change as a pricing model and to prevent the PIN debit networks from
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 entering the credit card market. Contrary to statements made by Federal
Reserve officials, Constantine argued that the Federal Reserve has author-
ity to regulate the debit card market, reasoning that it regulated the check
clearing system in the early 1900s to establish at-par clearance and that
debit card transactions are merely electronic checks. 
Turning to the state of the credit card market, Constantine offered evi-
dence for its failure, including barriers to entry (with Discover as the most
recent entrant in 1985), continuous and significant price increases without
losing merchants, and rules preventing Discover and American Express
from doing business (until recently) with bank issuers. Constantine also
discussed reasons that the 1986 NaBanco decision, which condoned Visa’s
interchange fee pricing model, is no longer valid. 
Constantine indicated that he expected additional legal challenges to the
collective setting of interchange as well as the rules that inhibit information
flow to consumers on payment alternatives. The aim would be to realign 
economic incentives so that consumers bear most of the cost of their choic-
es. At the same time, he emphasized that the Federal Reserve’s education role
is crucial to help the public understand the differences among payment
forms and the consequences of their choices.
In his remarks, Hanft painted a very different picture of these markets.
He stated that the card payment markets are competitive and benefit both
merchants and cardholders as the number of transactions and the numbers
of merchants accepting MasterCard have increased dramatically. In response
to accusations of market power and the lack of choice on the part of mer-
chants, Hanft noted that several large merchants, including Costco and
Neiman Marcus, and thousands of small merchants choose not to accept
MasterCard.
Hanft characterized demands to regulate interchange without regulating
merchant fees charged by the three-party systems as unfair, representing a
preference for corporate form. More generally, Hanft warned that government
setting of interchange fees will lead to increased use of less efficient three-party
card networks, stifling competition and raising costs for merchants and 
consumers. Hanft referred to the current experience in Australia, noting that
Diners Club and American Express cards are eclipsing the growth of the 
less expensive four-party cards, not by adding new customers but through
issuers converting their existing card portfolios. Further, Australian issuers are
raising cardholder fees and reducing service levels to compensate for lost 
revenue. This has caused the Reserve Bank of Australia to take further actions
to lower signature debit interchange fees and reduce the interchange revenue
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V. ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES
As noted by Weiner and Wright, most of the regulatory intervention in 
credit and debit card markets has been undertaken by antitrust and competition
authorities. Because the fee structure and network rules are documented in
agreements between competitors, payments networks that employ interchange
have faced ongoing scrutiny under competition laws. In certain circumstances,
however, collective price setting is permissible—where it produces efficiencies or
is necessary to the success of a joint venture. 
In a number of countries, antitrust and competition authorities are
actively reviewing these agreements as the market for card services has
matured. Four policy leaders from competition authorities in Canada, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union took part in
a panel discussion to offer their perspectives.
While Canada has not had any cases come before its Competition
Bureau directly addressing interchange, David Teal noted that the unique
nature of the card association’s membership structure in Canada may be
instructive. Canadian banks do not maintain dual membership in the card
associations. He suggested that this drives MasterCard, as the second
largest network, to use interchange to compete more aggressively for issuers
than might occur in dual markets. Teal pointed out that behavioral reme-
dies, as opposed to structural ones, may be more appropriate to preserve
the efficiencies that a single network makes possible, while addressing the
potential for abuse. As an example, he referenced the 1996 agreement
between the Competition Bureau and Interac, Canada’s debit card net-
work, that covered membership, governance, and price structure issues.
Bernhard Friess discussed the European Commission’s (EC) 2002 review
of Visa’s cross-border interchange fees. At issue in this case was that inter-
change fees represented a collective agreement among competitors that dis-
torted the market for issuing and acquiring services. The fee set a floor on
the price merchants paid for card payment services, and merchants lacked
information on how fees were set and, thus, the power to negotiate. While
the EC did not see interchange as essential to the successful operation of a
card payment network, it accepted two possible efficiency benefits of collec-
tively setting interchange fees. First, a multilateral agreement can reduce the
costs of negotiating many bilateral agreements. Second, interchange fees can
help optimize the utility of the payments network to its two sets of users,
merchants and cardholders. Friess noted the difficulty in measuring the
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 marginal utility to these categories of users and that a proxy was needed.
Given the controversy over cost-based interchange, it was interesting that
Visa proposed a set of remedies which included setting interchange fees
based on a benchmark comprised of three cost components of services 
benefiting merchants: transaction processing, the payment guarantee, and
the cost of the free funding period.
Friess suggested that the EC’s decision had broader implications in that the
remedies have set a “de facto standard” for other European competition
authorities in reviewing domestic interchange fees. Echoing Weiner and
Wright’s conclusion regarding country differences, Friess encouraged policy-
makers to look for ways to make the merchant acquiring market more 
competitive and to examine network rules that might constrain competition. 
In a paper prepared for the conference, “Public Policy and the Invisible
Price,” Sir John Vickers questions whether Adam Smith’s invisible hand
will guide the credit card markets to an economically efficient outcome.
He discusses the economic factors that influence the incentives of mer-
chants, bank issuers, and consumers. He notes the relevance of two princi-
ples emerging from the theoretical literature that are important to the
issue: the difference in “competitive intensity” between the issuing and
acquiring sides of the market and Rochet and Tirole’s “merchant resistance”
concept, which is the competitive interaction between merchants in differ-
ent sectors and the impact on merchants’ willingness to accept cards.
Vickers concludes that the level of interchange that is best for the major
card associations and their members could be significantly in excess of the
level that is economically efficient and best serves consumer welfare and,
therefore, raises a serious public policy question.
Vickers then discusses the pros and cons of three public policy approaches:
laissez faire, where the cost of intervention exceeds the benefits; remedies
under competition law; and specifically tailored regulatory measures. In his
discussion of competition law, Vickers notes that a key question is whether the
level of interchange fees indicates distortions in the market for card services
and what implications that has for who bears the burden of proof. Vickers
suggested that a natural benchmark to determine market distortion might be
if the level of interchange is such that merchants pay more than all of the costs
of the services provided jointly to retailers and cardholders. While pricing
asymmetries in two-sided markets are expected, Vickers suggested this bench-
mark as a trigger for competitive review and to shift the burden of proof to
the card associations to demonstrate that the agreements provide benefits to
consumers and do not restrain competition.
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Hesse defended the Department of Justice (DOJ) approach to competition
issues generally and in payments specifically. The DOJ’s preference is to
address competition problems as they are brought forward, by a merger or
a complaint, and with relatively narrow remedies that attempt to preserve
competition in markets and minimize government involvement. In a case
decided against Visa and MasterCard, DOJ argued successfully that Visa
and MasterCard’s “exclusionary rules,” which barred members from issu-
ing American Express and Discover cards, adversely affected competition
in the market for credit card network services. In 2003, the DOJ sued to
enjoin a merger between First Data and Concord, which would have
resulted in the combination of two of the three largest PIN debit networks
in the United States. Hesse noted that, in general, the DOJ views three-to-
two mergers as negatively impacting consumers by limiting competition
and to expect continued scrutiny of these types of mergers.
During the discussion period, audience members probed the panelists for
justification of remedies and action or inaction in their jurisdictions. Of
particular interest were the difficult consequences of cost-based pricing
remedies and whether three-party or unitary systems like American Express
would receive similar scrutiny if that model had become dominant. One of
the most interesting exchanges occurred when merchants questioned Hesse
about how the DOJ might view an agreement by merchants to establish
their own network with interchange set at zero. Hesse responded that it
could probably be done in way to avoid antitrust issues but cautioned that
the key question to be answered is whether provision of card services can
only be accomplished through collective action on the network side. 
VI. PANEL OF CENTRAL BANKERS
Central banks need to understand interchange fees because they are
responsible for general oversight of the payments system and have either
direct or advisory roles in payment competition policy. This panel brought
together representatives of central banks from countries in which there is
much discussion of interchange fees. The central banks of Australia and
Mexico have taken regulatory steps toward interchange fees and two panelists
from these banks provided an opportunity for the audience to hear about
their experiences. Representatives from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City and the European Central Bank each brought unique perspectives to
the panel. 
Thomas M. Hoenig reviewed information that could be usefully taken
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 from the conference. Presentations on the economic theory of two-sided
markets provided insight into their function and the role of interchange fees.
For example, theorists argue that a market-determined interchange fee may
be above, below, or equal to a socially optimal interchange fee. Whether this
outcome is accurate, however, needs to be explored further because these new
theories are complicated and currently underdeveloped. Besides economic
theory, the actual behavior of the market can provide information upon
which to evaluate performance. The recent success of card payments may
reflect strong competition in the market, yet courts in the United States have
found that card associations have market power and face limited competi-
tion. The ambiguity of market behavior might reflect different points of
view, but it may be wise not to completely abandon interchange fees as 
indicators of market performance despite their theoretical ambiguity. 
Hoenig concluded by observing that all participants agree that greater
transparency would be beneficial. If market participants would provide
more information to each other and to research analysts, more definitive
answers to important questions could be found. Added transparency could
also be a first step toward a better understanding of common interests in
efficient, safe, and accessible payments systems. 
Because the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has arguably been the most
active public authority in regulating interchange fees, Philip Lowe’s presen-
tation was highly anticipated. He first cited a mid-1990s RBA study of the
retail payments system which concluded that the PIN-based debit card 
system had lower operating costs than other card payment systems but that
cardholders faced a much higher price for using PIN debit. These price 
signals resulted in other card payments growing faster than PIN debit. The
study argued that interchange fees were the primary cause of these prices
and that competition among card issuers had the perverse effect of raising
interchange fees. After unsuccessfully seeking a voluntary reduction in 
interchange fees, the RBA instituted a regulation that required card net-
works to set interchange fees at or below a cost-based standard. As a result,
the interchange fees and merchant service fees each fell by a similar amount. 
Lowe offered some general observations about the RBA experience. The
RBA implemented gradual reforms because of the complexities of the card
payment market. Underdeveloped economic theory and a lack of empiri-
cal information has hampered the reform process and caused the RBA to
proceed carefully. Rather than identify optimal interchange fees, they chose
to move interchange fees in an appropriate direction. Good policy requires
designating one institution with ongoing responsibility for efficiency in the
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act proactively in response to anticompetitive behavior. 
The final two presentations by representatives of the Mexican and
European central banks offered a comparison of formulating payment sys-
tem policies in very different payment markets. In Mexico, few cash regis-
ters accept debit, and most retail payments are made with cash and checks.
Moreover, the banking industry is highly concentrated, with significant
barriers to entry in card issuing and acquiring. The payments market in the
euro area is highly fragmented, with 12 countries that host more than 20
card payment systems. The majority are national debit card systems, which
account for two-thirds of all card payments in the euro area. Cross-border
payments mostly use the Visa or MasterCard systems. There is a wide vari-
ety of fee arrangements and a wide variety of consumer payment habits. 
Guillermo Ortíz noted particular concerns in Mexico that include the
high interchange fees for debit transactions at small merchants and a struc-
ture of interchange fees across different payment systems that discourage the
use of electronic forms of payment. Banco de México has used a mix of vol-
untary actions and regulatory threat to implement reforms. This has been
aided by working with the banks that have shared cost information to help
the central bank understand the process of setting interchange fees. One
outcome is a unilateral agreement by banks to reduce interchange fees and
introduce interchange fee categories for different retail sectors. But Banco
de México also has issued regulations, such as requiring banks to disclose
fees, and made it compulsory for banks to allow payment of credit balances
through interbank electronic transfers. 
Ortíz observed that the Mexican central bank does not necessarily need
definitive economic theory to act if it observes barriers to entry and other
impediments to appropriate market processes. Reform is difficult because
it is not obvious what the socially optimal interchange fee should be.
Empirical research would help, but to do such research, central banks need
appropriate resources. Cooperation with industry participants produces
the best reforms, but a credible regulatory threat is helpful. Finally, policy-
makers need to be aware that improving efficiency in retail payments is a
long and continuous process. 
According to Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, the European Central Bank
(ECB) is currently concerned with integration of European payments sys-
tems with equal treatment of national and cross-border payments. The role
of the ECB is to facilitate bank efforts toward transparency and integra-
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 tion, but it will monitor developments closely and intervene if progress is
insufficient. The ECB expects that competition and transparency should
lead to appropriate interchange fees. 
Scrutiny of competition in payments in the European Union has gener-
ally been at the national level, reflecting the fragmented nature of the 
payments market. To aid payment integration, the ECB hopes that
national competition authorities develop policies that not only promote
payments competition in their countries but also facilitate the establish-
ment of pan-European card services. 
The session’s discussion period featured a variety of questions on inter-
change fee regulation and on the mechanics of the payments market. 
If interchange fees are regulated based on processing costs, are the
costs of extending credit or risk included? Panelists responded that
Australian regulations allow for the cost of the interest-free period, but
not because merchants benefited from the interest-free period. Instead
the RBA saw a need to formulate an interchange fee standard that was
pragmatic and transparent. In Mexico, regulation will require debit
interchange to be a fixed fee rather than a percentage of the sale because
debit transactions settle immediately and therefore do not carry the
same risk as credit card transactions. 
By what means can competition be enhanced, and how well can this
achieve regulatory goals? According to panelists, the Banco de México
thinks more competitors need to be brought in to the payments market,
perhaps by allowing nonbanks to be part of card networks. Elsewhere, the
European Commission in 2000 mandated a change in card association
rules to allow acquiring of transactions across national borders of the
European Community. In general, market outcomes are favorable with
enhanced entry to get the benefits of competition and economies of scale. 
Do central banks have a mechanism in place to track whether an inter-
change fee reduced through regulation has been passed to merchants in
the form of lower merchant service charges? In response, panelists argued
that it would be impossible to measure precisely because the effect would
be relatively small for individual retail prices. Logically, however, mer-
chants should see a significant reduction in their costs, and competitive
pressure implies that consumers will see lower prices. 
Is it safe to ignore three-party payments systems, such as American
Express, and concentrate on the regulation of the Visa and MasterCard
four-party systems? Panelists answered that the interchange fee in four-
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party systems deserves special scrutiny because it sets a floor to merchant
services. In addition, it is not true to say that reform in Australia has
ignored three-party systems. The RBA has asked American Express to
remove restrictions or improve transparency in order to ensure merchants
can fairly negotiate with American Express. 
VII. CONCLUSION
During the two days of presentations, discussion, and debate among lead-
ing economists, industry leaders, and policymakers, the need for interven-
tion in the credit and debit card markets was hotly contested. Sharply dif-
fering views between merchants and card issuers and networks left a percep-
tion that common ground may be difficult to find. However, there are sev-
eral reasons to be optimistic about the future. First, the conference facilitat-
ed a unique dialogue among the four key stakeholders that enhanced
knowledge about how these markets work. Second, there was agreement
among participants that more transparency in these markets will increase
the likelihood that they will work effectively and in the public interest.
Finally, industry participants offered to work with policymakers and
researchers to provide data that will better inform public policy actions to
ensure a safe and efficient payments system. 
Barbara Pacheco is a senior vice president, and Richard Sullivan is a sen-
ior economist in the Payments System Research Department.
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ENDNOTES
1Gerdes and Walton (2005).
2The merchant service charge is sometimes called the “merchant discount.”
3Additional details on topics such as payment authorization, third-party proces-
sors, cardholder fees, reward programs, card issuer processors, payments guarantees,
and risk can be found in Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003) and Hayashi, Sulli-
van, and Weiner (2003).
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